LAWDM0059 Judicial Review Problem Question Sample

For information and reference only – not to be submitted as your own work.

This is an abridged model-answer extract for the LAWDM0059 judicial review problem question (Public Law Coursework 2). This LAWDM0059 judicial review sample answer shows how to advise Minsk Hydro, ClearFlow and a new pressure group under a fictitious water-infrastructure statute. It follows the brief’s structure and OSCOLA style, citing authorities by name and neutral citation in the text. If you want help with method first, read our guide on how to answer a judicial review problem question.

Planning table

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LAWDM0059 judicial review framework: claim and grounds

Each client needs permission to apply for judicial review. The High Court may grant permission only if the claimant has a sufficient interest in the matter: Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(3). The claim form must be filed promptly and in any event within three months of the date the grounds arose: Civil Procedure Rules, r 54.5(1). Delay can also lead the court to refuse relief under s 31(6).

The grounds are the familiar three: illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (GCHQ)). The Critical Water Infrastructure Act 2026 gives the Water Infrastructure Authority (WIA) power to issue directions only for the purposes in s 3: water supply security, public health and safety, and infrastructure resilience.

Part A: Minsk Hydro

Standing and the decision

Minsk Hydro had its contract award revoked and has spent heavily on premises and staff, so it is directly affected. Sufficient interest is not in doubt. The live questions are which grounds are arguable and what relief is realistic.

Illegality: improper purpose and acting under dictation

A power must be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act: Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997. Section 3 does not list the wishes of the UK Government as a permitted purpose. If the revocation was driven by government pressure rather than by water security, safety or resilience, the WIA used its power for an extraneous purpose.

The evidence is thin, because the brief says only that the revocation “apparently” followed pressure. Minsk Hydro should seek disclosure and rely on the absence of reasons to support an inference. If the WIA had mixed motives, the court asks what the true or dominant purpose was.

Fettering of discretion

An authority with a statutory discretion may adopt a policy but must be prepared to listen to anyone with something new to say: British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610. If the WIA simply followed a government line without considering Minsk Hydro’s case on its merits, it fettered its discretion. This ground is strongest when paired with improper purpose, because both rest on the same factual inference.

Legitimate expectation

A public body that makes a clear promise, or follows a settled practice, may be held to it where reneging would be an abuse of power: R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213. The award of a contract is arguably a clear and unambiguous representation to this one bidder. Substantive protection is stronger where a promise is made to a small, identifiable group than where a broad policy changes (R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115).

Minsk Hydro must show reliance and detriment, which its expenditure supplies. Against that, the court will ask whether the WIA had an overriding public interest in revoking, and it will remember that a clear and unambiguous promise is required (R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61). We do not know whether the award was conditional, so the answer should flag that gap.

Procedural fairness and reasons

There is no general common law duty to give reasons, but fairness may require them where a decision is of great importance to the individual: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531. Withdrawal of an award on which a company has relied is such a decision. Fairness also points to notice and an opportunity to respond before a decision adverse to a party’s interests: Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40.

Prospects and relief

The usual result of success is a quashing order and fresh decision, not an order to award the contract. Damages are available in a judicial review claim only if included in the claim and recoverable in a private-law action: Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(4). Minsk Hydro should therefore be advised that its wasted expenditure may not be recovered by this route.

Part A: ClearFlow

Standing and the question

ClearFlow is the operator subject to the direction and has sufficient interest. The WIA relied on a legitimate power: s 3 covers public health and safety, and the stated reason is structural safety. Illegality is therefore weak unless the safety reason is a pretext. The contest is over rationality and proportionality.

Rationality and proportionality

Under the Wednesbury approach a decision is unreasonable only if no reasonable authority could have reached it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). That is a high bar. ClearFlow should argue instead for a structured proportionality review where its interests are seriously affected. The four questions in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 are: is the objective sufficiently important; is the measure rationally connected to it; could a less intrusive measure have been used; and does the measure strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community (Lord Sumption, [20]).

The strongest point is the less intrusive measure. A 40% reduction is blunt. If a targeted repair, inspection regime or phased reduction would have addressed the risk, the cut may fail at the third stage. The answer should say that the court will want to see the engineering evidence and whether the WIA tested alternatives.

National security and deference

Because ClearFlow’s output goes to the Ministry of Defence, the WIA may argue that national security informs the decision. Courts are cautious here (GCHQ), but the government must support the claim with evidence, not assertion. A direction that reduces output to the MoD cuts both ways: it may be said to protect safety while harming defence supply. The court is likely to defer on technical safety judgments yet still scrutinise process.

Procedural fairness

Was ClearFlow given the safety evidence and a chance to answer it? If not, there is a separate fairness ground on the Ridge v Baldwin principle. Non-compliance is punishable by heavy fines under s 2, which strengthens the case for fair process and for seeking interim relief.

Part B: the pressure group

Standing

The group is not itself a bidder. Sufficient interest is assessed with the merits in mind: R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617. In R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386 a campaigning body was held to have standing because of the importance of upholding the rule of law, the seriousness of the alleged breach, the absence of another likely challenger and the body’s role in the field.

Applied here, the group has a respectable argument on the seriousness of an undeclared conflict of interest. The weakness is that it is newly formed and has no track record, and an unsuccessful bidder is a more natural claimant. The best advice is that standing is arguable but not secure, and that the group should consider supporting or joining a bidder.

Apparent bias

The test is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the decision-maker was biased: Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357. The Chief Executive’s husband holds shares in the winning bidder, so a financial link exists. The point against the group is that she apparently did not know of it, and the observer is told of that.

The answer should say that the test is objective, so lack of knowledge is relevant but not conclusive. The group should ask who took the decision, who else was involved, and whether a conflicts register or recusal procedure existed. An institutional failure to identify the connection may itself support the inference. Automatic disqualification is unlikely because the interest is the husband’s, not hers.

Remedy and discretion

If bias is made out, the contract award may be quashed, but relief is discretionary and delay or the position of AquaTerra, which acted in good faith, may weigh against it (Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(6)). The group should act promptly, since the three-month limit runs from when the grounds arose.

Conclusion

Minsk Hydro has a good case on reasons and fairness and a respectable one on improper purpose, but its financial recovery is doubtful. ClearFlow’s best argument is proportionality, though the safety evidence and national-security context favour the WIA. The pressure group’s merits on bias are fair, but its standing is the weaker link. Each client should seek early disclosure and file promptly.

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References

Table of cases

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA)

Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 – https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/uksc/2013/39

British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 (HL)

Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL)

Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL)

Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357

R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61

R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 (HL)

R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA)

R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 (CA)

R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386 (QBD)

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (HL)

Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL)

Table of legislation

Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31 – https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/54/section/31

Civil Procedure Rules, Part 54, r 54.5 – https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part54

Critical Water Infrastructure Act 2026, ss 1–3 (fictitious statute set in the brief)